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Over the past generation Americans have forged a powerful
consensus in our public and social life against stereotyping people
based upon race, faith, gender, sexual orientation, ethnic origin,
and the like. Having grown up in the American South in the 1940's
and 1950's, I shiver to recall the macabre world of "white" and
"colored" drinking fountains and state-enforced school segregation
through which I passed. Schoolyard humor centered on ethnic
slurs; Polish jokes were particular favorites. Still in my day as a law
student, The New York Times classified its help wanted columns by
gender.
Happily, my children are growing up in a society that is bent
on casting off ethnic and other stereotyping. The message for to-
day's youth is that neither race nor gender nor ethnic origin defines
or limits human potential. Women can be firefighters or physi-
cians; recently, a Polish American succeeded an African American
as leader of the armed forces.
It is odd, therefore, to find Oscar Chase in the pages of this
journal! telling on the Americans what amounts to the Polish joke
of comparative law. The Americans, he says, are so defectively en-
dowed, so culturally impaired, that they cannot learn from the
stunning success of other systems of civil justice. Chase's essay is
directed at (or more precisely, directed to evading the import of)
an article that I published a decade ago, The German Advantage in
Civil Procedure.2 Basing himself upon tired ethnic stereotypes
about the individualism of Americans and the authoritarianism of
Germans, Chase says that the disgraceful, truth-defeating excesses
of adversary civil procedure in the United States deserve immunity
from a critique that is based upon comparative example. He as-
serts that our litigation mess embodies our culture, hence that we
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cannot learn from the superior civil justice systems elsewhere. He
is wrong.
I. THE GERMAN ADVANTAGE
The critique of contemporary American civil procedure that I
voiced in The German Advantage focuses on the shortcomings that
inhere in our adversary procedure on account of the power that we
allow partisan lawyers to exercise over the fact-gathering and fact-
adducing work of the legal system. The article contrasts the Conti-
nental tradition in civil procedure, exemplified in the system that I
know reasonably well, the German. The theme of the article,
whose detail I cannot reproduce here, is that German civil proce-
dure strikes a better balance between lawyerly and judicial respon-
sibility in the conduct of civil justice.
Witnesses. I spoke of the truth-distorting American practice of
allowing the parties' lawyers to engage in pretrial preparation
(coaching) of witnesses. And I pointed to the "bullying and other
truth-defeating stratagems"3 associated with cross-examination at
trial. I contrasted American practice with the German rule forbid-
ding lawyers for the parties to engage in pretrial communication
with nonparty witnesses.
I observed that when the Continental civil procedural tradi-
tion assigns courts rather than lawyers to lead the investigation in
matters of fact, it is doing nothing more than what Americans do
when they need to investigate matters of fact in their ordinary busi-
ness or personal affairs. The idea is that the decision-maker should
ask his or her own questions, rather than sit idly while opposing
adversaries engage in partisan examination and cross-examination.
I also applauded the tension-free, conversational style in which
German judges examine witnesses at trial, allowing witnesses to
tell their stories in their own words.
In German practice there is no distinction between pretrial
and trial. The COlli1: gathers evidence over the course of as many
hearings as it finds necessary. Our system of party appropriation
of witnesses (plaintiff's and defendant's witnesses) is unknown. All
witnesses are the court's, called by the court in aid of the court's
investigation into the truth of the parties' allegations. The parties'
lawyers nominate witnesses, and otherwise guide and oversee the
work of the court, but the court bears an independent responsibil-
3 Id. at 833.
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ity for seeking the truth. The parties' lawyers advise the court what
they want the court to investigate, and they may supplement the
court's questioning of witnesses if they wish.
By comparison with American practice, in which witnesses are
prepared (coached), then deposed in pretrial, then prepared
(coached) for trial, and then examined and cross-examined at trial,
the German system exhibits two central virtues, economy and ac-
curacy. German procedure investigates once what we do in four or
five repetitive installments. Further, by entrusting the main work
of examining witnesses and investigating other sources of evidence
to neutral experts whose job is to establish the truth, the Germans
escape the corrosive partisan bias that taints our fact-gathering
process. They know better than to put the adversaries, whose in-
terest is often to bend or to suppress the truth, in charge of fact-
gathering.
Experts. The ever-greater complexity of technology and busi-
ness practice in modem commercial life has made it harder for
courts to master the factual issues that arise in the most demanding
civil lawsuits. The natural step when a decision maker such as a
court lacks internal expertise is to seek expertise outside. I empha-
sized in The German Advantage the superiority of the Continental
arrangements for making expertise available to the courts. I re-
ported the disbelief that European jurists commonly express when
they learn that in American civil practice the parties' lawyers select
and prepare opposing experts. I explained in detail how "[i]n the
Continental tradition experts are selected and commissioned by
the court, although with great attention to safeguarding party inter-
ests."4 I contrasted the American battle of litigation-biased ex-
perts, which "leads to a systematic distrust and devaluation of
expertise."5
Eliminating needless search. In its trial phase, American civil
procedure employs a relatively continuous or uninterrupted pro-
ceeding. This trait is known in the literature of comparative law as
the principle of the concentrated trial.6 In order to prepare for the
concentrated trial, we have had to devise a pretrial discovery sys-
4 Id. at 835.
5 Id. at 836.
6 E.g., Arthur T. von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of
the Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, in 2 EUROPAISCHES RECHTSOENKEN IN
GESCHICHTE UNO GEGENWART: FESTSCHRIFT FOR HELMUT CoING ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG
361-71 (Norbert Horn ed., 1982).
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tern. Our pretrial process has grown increasingly onerous and ex-
pensive. As I explained in The German Advantage, "we have to
discover for the entire case. We investigate everything that could
possibly come up at trial, because once we enter trial we can sel-
dom go back and search for further evidence."7
In German procedure, by contrast, the court can investigate
and adjudicate in phases, confining the inquiry only to the mini-
mum necessary to resolve the case. The German court "ranges
over the entire case, constantly looking for the jugular - for the
issue of law or fact that might dispose of the case" guided by coun-
sel, who direct "the court's attention to particularly cogent lines of
inquiry."8 Fact-gathering is done only when and if it is really
needed.
Restraining judicial power. The German Advantage describes
the thick web of safeguards that protects litigants against the dan-
ger of judicial arbitrariness, eccentricity, bias, or incompetence
within this judicially-administered system of fact-gathering. An
elaborate incentive structure is designed to reward members of the
German career judiciary for diligence and to deter them from
abuse. Further, a far-reaching system of appellate review subjects
German trial courts to constant oversight.9 In truth, an arbitrary
trial judge is much more dangerous in the United States than in
Germany, on account of the presumption of correctness that at-
taches in our system to the conduct of the pretrial and the trial, as
well as to the judge's findings of fact. In German practice, the first
level of appellate review (Berufung) is review de novo, with no
presumption of correctness.
II. AVOIDING THE ISSUES
Oscar Chase's critique of The German Advantage is as re-
markable for what it does not say as for what it does. Chase does
not engage The German Advantage on the merits. He makes no
argument in support of having lawyers coach witnesses. He does
not defend the abusive cross-examination and other truth-defeat-
ing courtroom antics that so often disgrace the American trial bar.
He voices no praise for litigation-biased experts. He offers no jus-
tification for the wasteful juggernaut of American pretrial discov-
7 Langbein, supra note 2, at 83l.
8 Id. at 830.
9 Id. at 848-57.
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ery. He does not take issue with my account of the extensive
constraints on judicial power that the Germans achieve through the
incentive structure of their career judiciary and their tradition of
routinized appellate review.
Accordingly, Chase's critique effectively concedes the merits
by default. He has no answer to the claim demonstrated in such
detail in The German Advantage that German civil justice operates
with superior efficiency, accuracy, and fairness. What his argument
boils down to is the claim that we Americans cannot aspire to such
improvements because we are Americans and they are Germans.
Chase writes that, for "individualistic Americans," German civil
procedure would entail a "poor cultural fit."10 Enhancing the re-
sponsibility of the judge for fact-gathering, which is the central in-
stitutional adjustment that enables Continental legal systems to
avoid the partisan excesses of American adversary procedure, is a
choice that is foreclosed to Americans on account of "differences
in national culture."l1
Although Chase concedes that "in many important respects
the United States and Germany share a common culture,"12 he in-
sists that German civil procedure depends upon "[t]he 'authoritari-
anism' of the German culture," a trait that "is so often remarked as
to border on the platitudinous."13 Hoping to bolster the platitude,
Chase emphasizes his reading of one sociologist's cross-national
survey of supposed cultural values, a study conducted a quarter of
a century ago "through pencil and paper questionnaires adminis-
tered to the employees of a large multi-national corporation" in 66
countries.14 Chase admits that, "surprisingly," the survey re-
sponses found that "the U.S. and Germany both fell into the low
end"15 of the sociologist's "power distance index" scale for measur-
ing cultural "acceptance of hierarchical authority structures."16
Nevertheless, Chase manipulates the survey report to align it with
the platitude, emphasizing that the survey found the Germans
more prone than the Americans to something that the sociologist
labelled "rule authoritarianism,"17 that is, a tendency to value clar-
10 See Chase, supra note 1, at 7-9.
11 [d. at 7.
12 [d.
13 [d.
14 [d. at 11, citing GEERT HOFSTEDE, CuLTURE'S CONSEQUENCES 11 (1980).
15 Chase, supra note 1, at 11.
16 [d.
17 [d. at 12-13.
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ity and predictability in rules. Beneath the epithet "rule authorita-
rianism" is, of course, a value that American tradition has long
admired. It is called the rule of law, and it is associated with a
platitude about esteeming a government of laws, not of men.
III. CuLTURE Is A COP OUT
I cautioned in The German Advantage against the kind of ex-
ercise that Chase's article exemplifies: "allow[ing] the cry of 'cul-
tural differences' to become the universal apologetic that
permanently sheathes the status quo against criticism based upon
comparative example."18 There are two recurrent flaws in Chase's
reasoning. He exaggerates the extent of cross-cultural differences
in attitudes toward authority. Further, he does not carry his bur-
den of proof on causation. He simply asserts, rather than demon-
strates, that whatever cultural differences may exist suffice to
explain or justify the tawdry excesses of the American adversary
system.
The Continental advantage. In truth, the attributes of German
civil justice emphasized in The German Advantage are far from be-
ing culture-specific. Rather, these characteristics are broadly
shared among Continental legal systems. I took the German sys-
tem as my subject for comparative study for a simple reason of
convenience - it is the Continental system that I happen to be
familiar with (mostly as a byproduct of having spent some student
years in Germany doing research in legal history). Anyone conver-
sant with, say, Danish, Dutch, or Swiss civil justice could have writ-
ten a similar comparative critique of American civil procedure.
Some details would differ, but all Continental systems share the
attribute that Chase pretends is uniquely German and "authorita-
rian," that is, the greater responsibility of the judge for fact-gather-
ing. Thus, Chase's contention that German civil procedure reflects
a special German cultural predisposition toward authoritarianism
is wholly misguided, since the rest of Europe adheres to the same
principle that he ascribes to uniquely authoritarian German
culture.
All advanced Western countries, including the United States,
exhibit complex strands of individualism and authoritarianism.
The German and American armed forces, for example, are equally
authoritarian; privates obey generals. Germans and American pas-
18 Langbein, supra note 2, at 855.
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sengers are equally obedient to airline personnel when ordered to
fasten their seat belts and behave like sardines for the duration of
the flight. In my experience, Germans are more anarchic (individ-
ualistic) than Americans in highway driving, less so in pedestrian
traffic.
Chase's stereotypes of authoritarianism and individualism lack
consistency when tested against other countries. For example, in
my field of law, trusts and estates, the English and Commonwealth
legal systems are distinctive for the astonishing power (authoritari-
anism?) that they give to their judges to decide what shares of a
decedent's estate to award the widow, the children, and others.l9
In American practice, by contrast, we follow strict forced share
schemes ("rule authoritarianism"?) that deny the judge this au-
thority.2o Yet both the American and the English and Common-
wealth systems share the essential elements of adversarial civil
procedure. Thus, different attitudes toward empowering judges
can be found in legal systems that share the Anglo-American pro-
cedural tradition. Similar contrasts are apparent in Continental
countries. The Balkans and Italy have proven to be in many ways
ungovernable (individualistic), yet they share versions of the sensi-
ble form of judicially directed fact-finding that Chase wants to link
with authoritarianism.
Managerial judging. Chase's contrast between stereotypes of
German tolerance for judicial authority and American aversion to
judicial authority is further belied by the burgeoning trend in
American judicial administration to so-called managerial judging.
A high theme of recent American civil procedural scholarship is
the recognition of the immense power over pretrial management
that American judges have come to exercise, with scant safeguard
for litigants.21 If hostility to authoritarianism is, as Chase contends,
the defining American cultural trait that precludes greater judicial
responsibility for fact-gathering, he needs to explain why that cul-
tural trait has been so recessive against the advance of managerial
judging. .
19 John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced
Share, 22 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 303, 313-14 (1987).
wM .
21 Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences ofModern Civil Process, 1994
WIS. L. REv. 631 (1994); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline,
53 U. Qu. L. REv. 494 (1986).
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Transplanting. In questioning the portability of basic legal in-
stitutions across legal systems and across cultures, Chase is revisit-
ing one of the grand old topics of comparative law. Chase's
treatment is, however, ignorant in the technical sense of the word
"to ignore," because he neglects to engage with the literature of
comparative law. In the present generation the leading scholarly
treatment has been the series of books and articles by Alan Wat-
son, centered on the saga of how and why classical Roman law has
come to underlie so much of the private law of the modem world.22
Watson has emphasized (in William Ewald's apt summary) "the ex-
traordinary persistence, into the present day, of rules that were
first struck upon by a leisured class of slave-holding Italian aristo-
crats - men . . . who have been dead for nearly two thousand
years."23 Watson directs us to the ease with which "legal rules can
be transported from society to society," so that "the very same
rules of contract can operate in the worlds of Julius Caesar ... and
of the twentieth-century welfare state."24 Accordingly, it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that the transplanting of legal institutions is a
large topic, much ventilated in comparative scholarship. An author
who disdains the relevant literature in order to rely upon one sup-
posed sociological survey is not likely to have done much justice to
the subject.
IV. CONCLUSION
Americans operate a system of civil procedure whose excesses
make it a laughing stock to the rest of the civilized world. Our
system is truth-defeating, expensive, and capricious - a lawyers'
tax on the productive sector. Some Americans do not want to ad-
mit the dimensions of our failure in civil justice. Powerful vested
interests, especially at the trial bar, thrive from this dysfunctional
system. They do not want it subjected to the searching critique that
results from comparative study. Cultural chauvinism - the claim
that cultural differences prevent us from adopting and adapting the
superior procedural devices of other legal systems - is an effort to
22 See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN ApPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(2d ed., 1993); see also ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW (1985). For an insightful
account of the issues arising from Watson's work, see William Ewald, Comparative Juris·
prudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMPo L. 489, 489-90 n.l (1995)
(Ewald collects citations to Watson's vast oeuvre).
23 Ewald, supra note 22, at 490.
24 Id. (continuing to encapsulate Watson's work).
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switch off the searcWight of comparative law. In truth, the cultural
differences that touch on the basic choices in civil procedure are
trivial. The real explanation for the tenacity of our deeply deficient
system of civil justice is not culture, but a combination of inertia
and the vested interests of those who profit from the status quo.
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